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A B S T R A C T
Serendipity, the notion of researchers making unexpected and beneﬁcial discoveries, has played an important
role in debates about the feasibility and desirability of targeting public R &D investments. The purpose of this
paper is to show that serendipity can come in diﬀerent forms and come about in a variety of ways. The archives
of Robert K Merton, who introduced the term to the social sciences, were used as a starting point for gathering
literature and examples. I identify four types of serendipity (Walpolian, Mertonian, Bushian, Stephanian) to-
gether with four mechanisms of serendipity (Theory-led, Observer-led, Error-borne, Network-emergent). I also
discuss implications of the diﬀerent types and mechanisms for theory and policy.
1. Uncertainty, serendipity, and variety in serendipity
Almost all scholars who have studied research and innovation have
noticed that uncertainties are involved: from economists (Nelson, 1959;
Arrow, 1962) to historians (Rosenberg, 1994; Edgerton, 2007). They
have observed that many, if not most, research and innovation eﬀorts
fail to achieve anything noteworthy (Rothwell et al., 1974; Freeman,
1982; Petroski, 2006). Attrition and the spectre of failure loom over
basic and applied research, and exist in both science and technology
(Vincenti, 1990; Ziman, 1994).
Where research does happen to yield something of value, the results
are often quite diﬀerent from what was expected. The term serendipity
has been used to refer to this notion, that researchers make unexpected
and beneﬁcial discoveries (Merton and Barber, 2004; Sampat, 2014;
Murayama et al., 2015). However, it should be apparent that seren-
dipity can come about in a variety of ways and take diﬀerent forms.
Consider the following examples, all of which have been referred to as
“serendipitous”:
a A measles outbreak in Indian monkeys caused poliomyelitis vaccine
preparation to switch to African monkeys. This led Levine to dis-
cover the p53 tumour suppressor gene (Meyers, 2007, p. 161).
b Daguerre had spent years trying to coax photographic images out of
iodized silver plates. After yet another futile attempt, he stored the
plates in a chemicals cabinet overnight to ﬁnd the fumes from a
spilled jar of mercury accidentally produced a perfect image on the
plate (Box 256, Roberts, 1989, p. 49).
c Richet, whilst searching for threshold doses of various poisons,
discovered that he could induce sensitization to a toxic substance
thereby developing understanding of allergies and anaphylaxis (Box
427). Accepting his Nobel Prize, he said, “It is not at all the result of
deep thinking, but of a simple observation, almost accidental”
(Roberts, 1989, p. 125).
d Elrich discovered Salvarsan, dubbed the ﬁrst magic bullet, knowing
very little about how it worked. It emerged from an extraordinary
focus on the idea of chemotherapy (where chemicals might kill
pathogens selectively). Salvarsan was the 606th preparation, the
605 before it having each gone through their own set of experiments
(Box 424, Meyers, 2007, p. 62).
Clearly, the term serendipity is a label for a broad and multifaceted
phenomenon. Levine and Richet were searching in one problem space
(vaccinology and toxicology) when they came across their solutions for
quite another (oncology and physiology, respectively). The same cannot
be said of Daguerre and Elrich, who solved the same problems they
were working on (photography and chemotherapy), though the way in
which they arrived at their solution was unexpected (spillage, and trial
and error). Richet places emphasis on ‘simple observation’, Daguerre on
methodological error, Elrich on a committed hypothesis, and Levine on
a network that allowed him to connect ﬁelds as far as vaccinology and
oncology. Each of these emphases might have distinct implications for
policy and theory.
In this paper, I aim to clarify the meaning of the term serendipity,
principally by drawing attention to the heterogeneity of the phenom-
enon. I analyse “serendipitous” episodes to identify diﬀerent types and
mechanisms. Section 2 describes how I gathered my collection of
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2017.10.007
Received 8 December 2016; Received in revised form 5 August 2017; Accepted 14 October 2017
E-mail address: o.yaqub@sussex.ac.uk.
Research Policy 47 (2018) 169–179
Available online 18 October 2017
0048-7333/ © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
T
examples and where I learnt about much of the existing literature on
serendipity. Section 3 develops a typology of serendipity. Section 4
characterises some of the mechanisms by which serendipity may occur.
Section 5 discusses potential policy implications, and the desirability
and feasibility of measuring these types and mechanisms of serendipity.
Section 6 concludes.
2. Research design: Merton as an unexploited source for
serendipity
We are fortunate to stand on the shoulders of Robert K Merton, whose
prolonged interest in serendipity led him to chart its lexicographical history
and sociological semantics, a project that began in the 1940s and culmi-
nated with his posthumous book on serendipity with Elinor Barber in 2004.
I spent six months in the archive that holds Merton’s notes, most of which
have not been published. It contains his detailed reading notes relating to
serendipity, countless clippings from magazines, newspapers, and journals
mentioning serendipity, and correspondence with scientists and sociologists
of his day. From the Merton papers alone, I was able to hand-compile a
qualitative database containing dozens of examples of serendipity and build
an extensive bibliography with which I was able to ﬁnd (hundreds) more
examples of serendipity.
The Merton archive was a good place to start the search for varieties
of serendipity, not least because it was he, as one of the “most inﬂu-
ential sociologists of the twentieth century” (Calhoun, 2010, p. vii),
who introduced the term into the social sciences.1 The publication of
Merton and Barber’s (2004) book seems to have instigated much of the
recent scholarship focusing on serendipity (e.g. Cunha et al., 2010;
Murayama et al., 2015). Even publications that preceded Merton and
Barber (2004) seem indebted to Merton’s work or private commu-
nication with him (e.g. “Merton gave me an [unpublished] copy”
(Andel, 1994, p. 648)).
Merton, as a towering ﬁgure of sociology, had an extensive collegial
network that was aware of his interest in serendipity. Merton was sent
excerpts and examples of serendipity, one with a covering letter that
revealingly noted, “I don't know what is serendipitous about this, but it
appeared in American Airlines magazine” (Box 429:i4906). Merton
himself acknowledged that many of these short anecdotes of serendipity
are either understated or exaggerated, or apocryphal legends. Merton
scrawled reminders down margins to check for authenticity, most of
which went unanswered because he was unable to satisfy himself re-
garding their veracity.
However, for the purposes of building an initial typology of seren-
dipity patterns, my requirement was only that the examples be poten-
tially plausible. After screening the titles of the 513 manuscript boxes
that comprise the archive for possible relevance to serendipity, se-
lecting 38 boxes for perusal, and making detailed notes on 22 boxes and
their subfolders, I identiﬁed examples of serendipity and references for
further reading. I gathered them into a database totalling 118 examples,
taking note of the main protagonist(s), what was discovered, a short
(circa 60 words) description of how the discovery was made, and the
sources used to compile the example.
The most common way the examples were reported was by dis-
covery, a unit of analysis whose drawbacks I detail in Section 5. Most
discoveries were reported by multiple authors; these were recorded in
the database as a single example. Consistency and variation in accounts
of the same example allowed us to explore how the term serendipity
was being applied rather than to establish reliability of the example in
question through triangulation.
I coded the examples according to various characteristics because
they initially appeared as similarities and diﬀerences. I drew on re-
levant literature by matching patterns identiﬁed with those reported by
other authors. I iterated between the examples and emerging theory
before settling on the motivations underlying the discovery and the
outcomes of the discovery as two of the most important dimensions of
serendipity. As a result, eight examples were dropped from the database
following development of the typology.2 I developed a typology based
on these two dimensions, yielding four methodological ideal types
(McKinney, 1966; Bailey, 1994; Doty and Glick, 1994).
The next section will describe Walpolian, Mertonian, Bushian and
Stephanian serendipity types and will highlight some of the examples
reviewed as illustrative of each type. This is a conceptual rather than an
empirical endeavour. Conceptually, a sphere and a plane touch at only
one contact point, but empirically, allowances need to be made for the
roughness of surface and the pressure of a real sphere on a plane. Such
irregularities are lost when describing the ideal type because typologies
are only instrumental and subordinate to the aims of the research. Since
there is no such thing as a type independent of selective interests and
the purposes for which it was developed, I make my interests and
purposes explicit in Section 5, outlining how they reside in certain re-
search policy problems.
3. An illustrated typology of serendipity
I analysed hundreds of discoveries referred to as serendipity using a
number of guiding questions. What are the similarities and diﬀerences
across the examples, and between the various accounts of the same
discoveries? How are authors (implicitly or explicitly) justifying their
use of the term serendipity in their account? I found two consistently
reappearing themes: the motivations underlying the discovery and the
outcomes of the discovery. They can help one to determine whether a
discovery is serendipitous or not, and also serve as dimensions along
which serendipitous discoveries may be distinguished as diﬀerent ideal
types. This section will describe the four types and will provide some of
the examples reviewed as illustrative of each type.
3.1. Targeted search solves unexpected problem
Serendipity has been an inherently ambiguous word since its ﬁrst
documented use in 1754. Horace Walpole’s whimsical reference to a
tale about the Three Princes of Serendip combines accident with sa-
gacity. Most pertinently, the Princes were making discoveries “of things
which they were not in quest of” (Merton and Barber, 2004, p. 2). This
forms the basis of our ﬁrst type – Walpolian serendipity – discovery of
things which the discoverers were not in search of – for which I can
oﬀer some of the most well-known discoveries as examples.
In 1897, whilst searching for a way of extracting proteins from
bacteria for immunization, Buchner discovered that cell-free yeast ex-
tract could still convert sugar to alcohol and carbon dioxide. This dis-
covery proved that whole cells were not necessarily required for fer-
mentation and thereby inaugurated the ﬁeld of enzymology (Kohler,
1971; Box 378: i1652). In 1943, an explosion left soldiers exposed to
mustard gas. Investigators were dispatched to ﬁnd out whether it was
an enemy bombing. Instead they found soldiers’ white blood cell counts
dropping. The link was made that perhaps mustard gas, or its deriva-
tives, could treat cancers caused by the over-expression of white blood
cells – modern chemotherapy was born (Meyers, 2007, p. 123).
The most important features of this type of serendipity are the
1 Merton’s interest in the ‘unanticipated consequence of purposive social action’ was
published in 1936. His ﬁrst published usage of the term serendipity was in 1945. Merton
went on to deﬁne the term explicitly in 1948. These dates coincide with the start of its
rapid diﬀusion according to Google Ngram, which charts the usage of any word found (in
sources printed between 1800 and 2012, in the major languages, normalised by number
of books published annually).
2 These examples would be better described as co-incidental multiples rather than as
serendipity. They are remarkable because the discovery was made simultaneously and
independently, and this seems to be the sole basis upon which the word serendipity was
used. (Though, Cozzens (1989) suggests that the term multiples may be an artefact of
social control and co-ordination processes in science for resolving priority disputes over
the degree of similarity between discoveries.)
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unanticipated and unexpected nature of the discovery, the fact that
investigators were searching in one problem space but made their dis-
covery in another.
3.2. Targeted search solves problem-in-hand via unexpected route
Merton’s deﬁnition extended Walpole’s conception of serendipity by
asking not only what the original research motivations were, but also
what the signiﬁcance of the discovery was for further research.3 By
drawing attention to the outcome, Merton concludes that “Walpole’s
emphatic insistence that his term must be limited to discoveries that
were not at all in quest of,” – i.e. that no intended discovery can qualify
as serendipity – means that Walpole’s original deﬁnition “is too re-
strictive a concept of the role of serendipity in science” (Box 428:
i1594).
Thus, I distinguish Mertonian serendipity where the discovery may
lead to the solution of a given problem via an unexpected route, as
distinct from the more traditional type of serendipity where the dis-
covery leads to the solution of an entirely diﬀerent problem.
Serendipitous moments in a research program might have played an
incidental but signiﬁcant role in the solution of a problem that was
targeted from the outset.
Some well-known examples ﬁt this type. By 1837, Goodyear had
been searching for a decade for a way to make rubber thermostable,
when he accidentally allowed a mixture of sulphur and rubber to touch
a hot stove and discovered vulcanisation (Box 378: i1667; Halacy,
1967). In 1948, Cade speculated that mania might be caused by ab-
normal metabolism of uric acid. He injected uric acid in the form of a
lithium salt and observed dramatic therapeutic responses. However, it
emerged that the uric acid part of the drug had nothing to do with its
eﬀectiveness. It was only the fact that a lithium salt of the acid was used
that was responsible for the eﬀect, other lithium salts were equally good
(Box 427: i4873).
3.3. Untargeted search solves an immediate problem
There is a further direction in which I can build on Merton’s deﬁ-
nition to open up other types of serendipity. There may be no particular
problem in mind, perhaps because the research is at an exploratory or
basic stage and more concept formation may be needed to develop
detailed hypotheses. Or, the professed goals and outcomes of the re-
search may be so far away that the project objectives might as well be
called un-targeted. Vannevar Bush claimed that pertinent discoveries
“often come from remote and unexpected sources” (Bush, 1945, p. 14;
see also Balconi et al., 2010).
The deﬁning feature of this Bushian type is that the discovery leads
to a not sought-for solution because the research was un-targeted, or
was not research at all. In an analogy to shopping, one may visit shops
without intending to buy anything, but in the course of browsing be
reminded of one’s needs and how a product may serve those needs.
In 1879, as part of a research program into the general properties of
sugar (as opposed to one with a speciﬁc goal), Fahlberg discovered
saccharine, an artiﬁcial sweetener, after noticing a sweet taste on his
hands (Box 427: i1634).4 In 1895, Roentgen was preparing to recreate
phenomena documented by Crookes, and tinker with them. In his
emulation, he noticed a mysterious glow, a new form of radiation he
called X-rays (Box 427; Box 378; Shapiro, 1986).
Many drug discoveries also ﬁt the Bushian type of serendipity. In
1844, Wells witnessed a man who, under the inﬂuence of laughing gas,
injured his leg but claimed not to feel any pain; Wells used the com-
pound as an anaesthetic thereafter. In 1947, Dr Gay prescribed a new
antihistamine for a patient suﬀering from hives. The patient returned
and reported that, “by the way, doctor, this is the ﬁrst time I haven’t
become dizzy or nauseated on the ride to your oﬃce.” (Box 424; Box
427: i1634, i4873). Dramamine became a motion sickness preventive.
Similarly, in 1980, Minoxidil was being used as a treatment for high
blood pressure when it was discovered to have hair retention and re-
generation properties. Novocaine and Xylocaine were eﬀective anaes-
thetics that were also discovered to be antiarrhythmic (Roberts 1989, p.
200).
However, such re-purposing of drugs approved for existing uses into
multi-purpose drugs should be distinguished from re-developed drugs that
were being developed for one use, but whose development path
changed in favour of another use. The latter, re-developed drugs, would
be Walpolian type serendipity taking eﬀect before a drug has been
approved. The infamous example is Viagra, which in the mid-1990s
Pﬁzer was developing for angina, when clinical trials reported (besides
its poor eﬃcacy) that the drug could treat patients with erectile dys-
function. Another example is imipramine, an ineﬀective schizophrenia
treatment found to work as an antidepressant (Box 424; Box
427:i4873). Note the way in which both these drugs remained single-
purpose, which distinguish them from Bushian serendipity.5
3.4. Untargeted search solves a later problem
Within un-targeted research, I believe there is another type of ser-
endipity, whose deﬁning feature is when un-targeted research comes
upon a new unsought-for problem and unsought-for solution. Neither
the problem nor the solution existed prior to the serendipitous episode.
Paula Stephan describes it as “ﬁnding answers to questions not yet
posed” (Stephan 2010: p232). Stephanian discovery serves to pique
one’s curiosity, even though it does not directly solve an immediate
problem, and holds interest until it solves a later problem.6
In 1903, Benedictus dropped a ﬂask. The ﬂask shattered but he
noticed to his surprise that the fragments of glass did not ﬂy apart, the
ﬂask remained almost in its original shape. He found that it had a ﬁlm
on the inside to which the broken pieces of glass had adhered. He
realised that this ﬁlm had come from the evaporation of a solution of
collodion (cellulose nitrate, prepared from cotton and nitric acid) which
the ﬂask had contained. After the incident, Benedictus learned of au-
tomobile accidents, with serious consequences from ﬂying glass. This
was the problem for which his solution was waiting, and his non-
shattering ﬂask became safety glass (Roberts, 1989, p. 156).
In an another example, in 1820, Oersted was heating a wire by an
electric current when he noticed that every time the current was
switched on, a nearby compass needle was moved. When Oersted’s
reported this discovery, it caused a “stir” (Box 424; Kohn, 1989, p. 12)
but did not immediately solve any conundrums; it was merely received
as an interesting new phenomenon. However, the discovery would go
on to solve problems that were yet to be formulated, a decade later, by
the likes of Faraday and Morse who would identify electromagnetic
induction and develop the telegraph system (Box 429:i4926).
3 “The pattern refers to the experience of observing an unanticipated, anomalous, and
strategic datum which becomes the occasion for developing new theory” (Merton, 1948,
p. 506). Serendipity is one of four ways in which Merton notes that empirical research can
inﬂuence theory (see Heinze et al., 2013, p. 830 for the others).
4 He noticed that his sandwich tasted sweeter than usual, and returned to the labora-
tory where he tasted everything on his worktable—all the vials, beakers, and dishes he
used for his experiments. He found the source: an overboiled beaker in which o-sulfo-
benzoic acid had reacted with phosphorus (V) chloride and ammonia, producing benzoic
sulﬁnide. Though Falhberg had previously synthesized the compound by another method,
he had no reason to taste the result. Once he tasted the value of the substance he took out
a patent for it in 1885.
5 It is possible for a drug fall into both categories at diﬀerent times. For example, as-
pirin was ﬁrst prepared as an antiseptic but was found to be ineﬀective and re-developed
into an analgesic and antifebrile. It is now being investigated as a multi-purpose drug for
suppressing tumors and cardiac arrest (Roberts, 1989, p. 195; Meyers, 2007, p. 149)
6 For Stephanian serendipity, one might invert Plato’s well-known phrase, ‘Necessity is
the mother of invention’, to ‘Invention is the mother of necessity’.
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3.5. Towards a taxonomy
In summary, one can conceive of at least four types of serendipity
which emerge from the nature of the inquiry and the solution. The
dimensions of this typology seem to resonate with other literature
(Nightingale and Scott, 2007; Stokes, 1997; Senker, 1991). In parti-
cular, the emphasis on outcome as well as motivation is consistent with
Calvert’s (2004) study of what constitutes ‘basic research’. Her inter-
views with scientists and policymakers reveal diﬀerent usages of the
term and a range of views, which she categorised into six dimensions of
variation. The two dimensions most frequently referred to by inter-
viewees were epistemological (nature of the knowledge produced) and
intentional (aims of research). Calvert argues that ambiguity over its
meaning (i.e. choice over which dimensions to emphasise) gives the
term its political character, and understanding the diﬀerent reasons for
deﬁning in diﬀerent ways could lead to a more enlightened discussion
(2004:266). Whilst there are parallels that can be drawn for serendipity
and its political economy, I do not mean to suggest that serendipity is
restricted to, or synonymous with, basic science.
Basic and applied research categories may not necessarily be helpful
or illuminating for studying serendipity. Findings that unexpectedly
turned out to be very signiﬁcant for basic science have often emerged
from applied work on practical problems. Pasteur’s work in the French
wine industry helped establish bacteriology (Box 427), Carnot’s eﬀorts
to improve steam engine eﬃciency helped to bring about thermo-
dynamics, Bell Lab’s eﬀorts to remove static hiss from telephones
helped to create radio astronomy (Box 424). Sometimes the switch
between science and technology can be quite immediate (Nightingale,
2014), suggesting that our discussion of serendipity can pertain to
both.7
Drawing boundaries between the quadrants in Fig. 1 is likely to be
challenging in practice. In Merton’s private notes, he alludes to this
when he observes that “It seems customary to speak of serendipitous
discoveries as though they were wholly unanticipated or accidental…
[but] there are degrees of serendipity.” (Box428: i1594). Though I
distinguish between solutions for problems that were either given or
wholly diﬀerent, problems can in practice be partially solved, or partly
abandoned in favour of another. With a drug, I may look to its formally
approved indication to decide whether the problem solved was given or
wholly diﬀerent, but in most other cases such a convenient marker for
sanctioned use may not be available. So the possibility that a discovery
can displace or solve the original problem to diﬀering degrees strikes us
as an important feature of serendipity for empirical inquiry.
Similarly, whilst I distinguish between targeted and un-targeted
search, in practice, lines of enquiry may be much harder to demarcate.
One can have organisations and statistical categories dedicated to un-
targeted research, but there can still exist diﬀering degrees of targeted
enquiry. For example, Fahlberg’s discovery of artiﬁcial sweetener was
made as part of a research program that aﬀorded him a broad and
general remit, but if one takes note that the program was established
and maintained by a sugar import company, the inquiry seems dis-
tinctly more targeted.
Although it may be diﬃcult to separate out strict classes of serendipity
by theoretical discussion alone, these two dimensions seem to be non-trivial.
They provide us with at least four types of serendipity to help guide further
empirical inquiry. McKinney (1966, p. 13) oﬀers guidance on how this
might be done: “The constructed type is a pragmatic expedient and does not
purport to be empirically valid. The main purpose it serves is to furnish a
means by which concrete occurrences can be compared, potentially mea-
sured, and comprehended. The comparison and measurement of empirical
approximations reveal nothing but deviations from the construct. This is not
only to be expected, but is to be sought after, for it is the basis of the value of
the typological method. These deviations will be relative… If degree of
deviation is to be determined repetitively and comparatively, then the base
measurement (the type) must be held constant. The relations between the
elements (criteria) of the type are postulated relations; therefore they may
be legitimately be held constant”.
In the next section, it is these “relations between the elements
(criteria)” that I explore as underlying mechanisms of serendipity. In
doing so, I address Doty and Glick’s (1994, p. 230) concern that “most
typological theories are inadequately developed because the causal
processes operating within each type are not fully speciﬁed” leading to
“over-emphasis on describing the typology and under-emphasis on
developing the theory” Doty and Glick (1994, p. 231).
4. Factors and mechanisms of serendipity
I suggested that serendipity can be identiﬁed by examining research
motivations and research outcomes, and may take one of four types:
Walpolian, Mertonian, Bushian and Stephanian. However, the typology
tells us little about the mechanisms underlying these serendipity types.
In my search for mechanisms, I compared hundreds of examples of
serendipity for similarities and diﬀerences that help to describe how
serendipity happens. Unlike types of serendipity, which were mutually
exclusive (and whose boundaries were somewhat blurry), I believe each
of these mechanisms of serendipity is to a degree necessary (none are
likely to be suﬃcient on their own).
Four consistently reappearing themes emerged from the comparative
analysis. Serendipity may be theory-led, observer-led, error-borne or network-
emergent. Serendipity may become conspicuous because the growth of
theory makes it stand out to any given observer; or serendipity may be ob-
servable only to some with certain tools, techniques and attributes; or ser-
endipity may emerge following methodological deviations, errors, and spil-
lages; or serendipity may involve a network of actors. This section will
describe the four mechanisms in more detail and provide some of the ex-
amples reviewed as illustrative of each mechanism.
4.1. Serendipity and theory
This mechanism is about the idea that serendipity requires deviation from
theoretical expectations. Without some contrast to theory an event cannot be
serendipitous, it is mere chance.8 Louis Pasteur considered chance to be a
subordinate of theoretical advance: “Without theory, practice is but routine
born of habit.” (Radot, cited in Merton and Barber, 2004, p. 162). Pasteur
illustrates with his account of telegraph development, and in doing so makes
one of the most quoted remarks about serendipity.
“Oersted held in his hands a piece of copper wire, joined by its ex-
tremities to the two poles of a Volta pile. On his table was a
Fig. 1. A typology of serendipity in research.
7 For example, in the serendipitous development of the pacemaker, Greatbatch and a
physician were working to ﬁnd a way to record heartbeats when Greatbatch happened to
grab the wrong resistor. The error meant that the device was simulating the heartbeat, not
recording it. The pacemaker was deployed, less to record and study the heartbeat than to
intervene and oﬀer a technological therapy for those with an irregular heartbeat.
8 As Keynes (1921, p. 10) noted, “I say, if a coin falls head it is ‘by chance’, whereas its
falling heads is not at all improbable… The fall of the coin is a chance event if our
knowledge of the circumstances of the throw is irrelevant to our expectation of the pos-
sible alternative results. If the number of alternatives is very large, then the occurrence of
the event is not only subject to chance but is also very improbable…”.
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magnetised needle on its pivot and he saw (by chance you will say,
but chance only favours the mind which is prepared) the needle
move and take up a position quite diﬀerent from the one assigned to
it by terrestrial magnetism.”
Theory or experience allows any given observer to identify the
serendipitous episode as being incongruent with predictions and ex-
pectations. A 1963 Science article (Box 378; i1641) describes the the-
oretical lead-up to the discovery of uranium ﬁssion:
“The experimenters had posed an interesting, clear-cut question, ‘Is
radium a product of irradiation of uranium?’ They devised an ap-
propriate set of experiments to answer the query. The result was
certain to be important, whatever it was. If they had proved that
radium was a product, the result would have been considered very
important, though not so signiﬁcant as what they actually found.”
(p1177).
A more recent example is the discovery of angiostatins: Folkman was
investigating potential substitutes for blood in transfusions when he ob-
served that tumors often stopped growing when they were quite small
(Meyers, 2007, p. 145). He theorised that tumors needed to develop their
own blood vessels to grow bigger. The search for blood vessel growth in-
hibitors was now a given when Folkman's team noticed a fungus that had
contaminated a culture dish of endothelial cells and arrested their growth. A
second more eﬀective inhibitor was discovered by a chance encounter at a
conference. As Pasteur might have noted, chance played a subordinate, if
not subsequent, role to theory development in this episode. The growth of
theory may guide the observer on where to look, restricting the scope for
their possible observations and inferences.
4.2. Serendipity and individuals
Even within a given scientiﬁc or technological paradigm (Kuhn,
1962; Dosi, 1982), there is a varied distribution of skills, techniques and
talents across individuals, and unequal access to diﬀerent kinds of
equipment, instruments and other resources. I discuss two factors, ob-
servation routines and instrumentation, that may aﬀect an observer’s
perceptiveness (variation in what individuals notice). These stand as
possible factors of serendipity distinct from the prepared mind theme
discussed previously.9
Individual attributes may aﬀect perceptiveness for serendipity. For
example, in 1912, Ramsey demonstrated his newly discovered gases by
passing an electrical charge through them to show their vivid colours. It
was only Claude, seeing the same experiment as the 500 or so who also
heard the lecture, who realised its commercial importance as the ﬁrst
neon light (Box 256: i1733). Similarly, many scientists had operated on
the African frog whose skin contained the antimicrobial magainin, but
it was only Zasloﬀ who noticed it (Roberts, 1989, p. 169). Another
example is the discovery of gut bacteria and peptic ulcers by Warren
and Marshall, made despite the prevailing view of gastroenterologists
(Meyers, 2007, p. 105).10
Routines and systems for observation might support serendipity in
some individuals rather than others. Darwin is admired not only for his
eponymous theoretical contributions but also for the way he system-
atically documented his observations, recording even the most trivial of
his musings, and for curating and cataloguing a vast collection of spe-
cimens. Ecologists and astronomers pay particular attention to catalo-
guing what they observe. Pathologists have a systematic approach to
examining a corpse, a system so prized that the completeness of ob-
servation might even be considered by some to take precedence over
establishing cause of death.11
For example, Warren who discovered gut bacteria, was a pathologist
sensitised not to current theory on gastroenterology but to bacteria
repeatedly cropping up in biopsy. In an example where a nurse noticed
that jaundiced infants placed near the window in the sunshine re-
covered faster, she did so in a hospital – a highly observed and struc-
tured environment (Roberts, 1989, p. 136). The nurse was presumably
in the habit of reporting her observations to others as part of her pro-
fession, her report was followed up and UV light for neonatal infants is
now standard. Similarly, in another example, insulin was discovered
when a technician noticed the swarm of ﬂies that gathered around the
urine of pancreas-less animals (because it was later found to be loaded
with sugar) (Box 378: i1666; Box 424). So, in various forms of inquiry,
one can see that traditions, systems and protocols for observation have
emerged. In the cases of the pathologist, nurse and technician noted
above, it was not so much theory as it was the observation system that
helped them to notice their discoveries.
Observations are usually mediated by instruments, and the devel-
opment and use of instruments themselves play an important role in
serendipity. This is not necessarily the testing of theories nor the re-
plication of experiments, but rather the trying out of new practices.
Price (1984) notes that a great deal of laboratory work involves prac-
ticing old techniques, tinkering and ﬁddling to produce a new tech-
nique or ‘research technology’ (Joerges and Shinn, 2001), then using it
on everything in sight. Such work, without being strongly anchored to
any particular theory, means “experimentation has a life of its own”
(Hacking, 1983, p. 250), and occasionally, the experimenter will pro-
duce qualitatively new eﬀects (Rheinberger, 1997). Heinze et al. (2013)
oﬀer evidence for this line of thought with a sophisticated analysis of
the follow-up research to two Nobel Prize-winning breakthroughs.
Instruments can be developed and used quite free from theory,
playfully even. Fleming, for example, would streak his agar plates with
bacteria that would yield diﬀerent coloured colonies, allowing to him to
‘play’ with diﬀerent patterns that would emerge after incubation (such
as a Union Jack, rock-gardens, a mother feeding a baby) (Box 427).
Nylon was discovered at Du Pont whilst attempting to develop artiﬁcial
silk, but seemed initially to lack useful properties. Whilst playing
around with the material however, speciﬁcally running down the hall
whilst stretching it out, useful properties were found (Marvel, 1981).12
When Langmuir discovered gas-ﬁlled lamps, it was by playing around
with bad vacuums rather than by diligently improving them, and in
using diﬀerent gases to see how bad they made the lamp, he discovered
better performing lamps (Box 256: i1732).
The use of instruments by individuals unaware of prior theoretical
predictions can be the basis for serendipity. Astronomers Baade and
Zwicky predicted pulsars three decades before their discovery, and
physicist Gamov predicted cosmic microwave background radiation
two decades before its discovery – both predictions needed to wait for
9 Most science and technology studies scholars subscribe to the idea that observations
are never completely free from theoretical framings and are, to some extent, ‘theory-
laden’ (see Hess, 1997). But, by expressing their claims in matters of degree, they also
leave open the possibility of observations that are weakly framed by theory.
10 Specialists at the time thought that no bacteria existed in the guts after biopsies
failed to reveal any bacteria. Warren noticed large numbers of bacteria in biopsy samples
of patients with gastritis, and that the stomach cells near the bacteria were damaged.
Warren struggled to attract attention from gastroenterologists to his ﬁnding. Marshall, a
resident doctor on gastro-rotation, initially noticed that bacteria were clinically relevant
when he treated a gastritis patient successfully with antibiotic. So he tried to culture the
bacteria for characterisation and testing. He thought the spiral bacteria were of the
campylobacter genus, which grow in two days. On this basis, the lab discarded agar plates
after 48 hours if no growth was visible. After months of failed attempts at culturing the
bacteria, Marshall left for the Easter weekend and the plates were inadvertently left in the
dark humid incubator for 5 days. Marshall returned to ﬁnd the culture growing (Meyers,
2007, p. 105).
11 “Being thorough is essential… with cancer resections for example a speciﬁc format
is in place when reporting results to avoid missing important information.” (personal
communication 2015, Mr Patel, vascular surgeon).
12 Hill noted that if he gathered the polymer with a glass stirring rod and drew it out of
the mass, it extended and became silky in appearance. Hill and his colleagues wanted to
see how far they could stretch one of these samples, and ran down the hall. In doing so,
they realised they were orienting the polymer molecules and increasing the strength of
the product into something more useful (Marvel, 1981).
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observers equipped with suitably developed instrumentation for vali-
dation (Box 424). The observers’ lack of awareness of prior predictions
is what made their discoveries serendipitous. This contrasts with the
discovery of the Higgs-Boson particle, which also had a long interval
between theoretical prediction and empirical validation but was non-
serendipitous because the search eﬀort was dedicated to the theoretical
prediction.
4.3. Serendipity and the tolerance of error
Inquiry can be loosely directed, allowing errors to seep in to ex-
perimental design whilst also hoping those very errors will be a source
of serendipity (Box 428). The physicist Max Delbruck nonchalantly
dubbed this the principle of ‘limited sloppiness’ (Salvador Luria simi-
larly called it ‘controlled sloppiness’ and Root-Bernstein (1988; Box
427:i4883) refers to the making of ‘intelligent mistakes’).13 For Luria, if
a parameter is varied accidentally, one might be able to track down any
unexpected results back to that variation. “It often pays to do somewhat
untidy experiments, provided one is aware of the element of untidiness.
In this way, unexpected results have a chance to come up. When they
do, I can trace their cause to the untidy, but known, features of the
experiment.” (Luria 1955, in Merton and Barber, 2004, p. 192)
Mistakes play a prominent role in accounts of serendipity, where
seemingly critical substances have been dropped or spilled. See for in-
stance Nobel on dynamite, Kolliker and Muller on electro-cardiac ac-
tivity, Hyatt on celluloid, and Chardonnet on artiﬁcial silk (Box 256;
Roberts, 1989; Meyers, 2007). Substances have been inadvertently
heated or exploded in serendipitous episodes. For example, Goodyear
on vulcanisation, Stookey on ceramic glass, Davison and Germer on
electron waves, and Elrich on bacterial staining (Halacy, 1967, p. 73;
Box 256: i1727; Box 424:7). Serendipitous episodes have also emerged
after substances were forgotten about in pockets, or laid to rest over
vacations. For example, Spencer and the microwave oven, Becquerel
and radiation treatment for cancer, Fleming culturing penicillin, Pas-
teur attenuating vaccination, Becquerel noticing radioactivity, and
Marshall culturing gut bacteria (Box 378: i1650 and i1664; Box 427;
Halacy, 1967). Contamination, methodological blunder and equipment
malfunction also feature frequently in accounts of serendipity, as well
as assumed equipment failure. For example, Fleming’s lysozyme and
penicillin, Warren’s gut bacteria, and Folkman’s angiostatin, Dotter’s
angioplasty, Furchgott’s vasodilation, Vorhees’ vascular stents, Galvani
and Volta’s battery, Nicholson and Carlisile on water structure, Swallow
and Perrin’s polythene, Fox’s polycarbonate, Bell and Watson’s tele-
phone and Penzias and Wilson’s background radiation (Box 256; Box
378; Box 424; Box 427; Box 429; Roberts, 1989; Meyers, 2007).
4.4. Serendipity and networks
There are at least three ways in which networks are pertinent for
serendipity. Firstly, networks play an informational role, bringing dis-
coveries to the attention of researchers who can exploit them. Secondly,
networks play a teamwork role, where exploitation of an observation
may require the skills and resources of multiple people. Thirdly, net-
works could discourage serendipity via ‘groupthink’ or ‘echo-chamber’
eﬀects.
There is a growing body of literature indicating that a researcher’s
output, both in terms of quantity and quality, is related to their position
within a collaborative network (Balconi et al., 2004; Rotolo and
Petruzzelli, 2013). The strength of weak ties may govern exposure to
novelty (Granovetter, 1973) and opportunities to broker information
and resources from certain points within a network may oﬀer a locus
for serendipity to emerge (Burt, 2004). Scholars embedded in more
diverse research networks may be more likely to recognise and pursue
serendipitous discoveries simply because they have more information
to hand, or more likely, know where to go in order to source the in-
formation.
In the case of the background radiation discovery, Penzias and
Wilson could only make sense of their results after contacting physicists
(Box 424). A more recent example is that of Agre, who was trying to
isolate and characterise the Rh blood group antigen when a second
protein kept appearing in the tests (Dreifus, 2009). Initially, it was
considered a contaminant or a breakdown by-product of Rh isolation,
but it showed up in all types of cells. Agre proved that this other protein
was in fact a cell membrane channel protein after he visited his hae-
matology professor, who suggested that as the explanation.
In addition to information exchange, there is an also a teamwork
role that networks play. In his 1933 essay on the craft of experimental
physics, Blackett suggests craft specialty may restrict the scope for
serendipity:
“The experimenter is always a specialist and does not often change
his technique… Often he cannot usefully do so, for there are few
experiments which do not need a considerable apprenticeship.” (Box
378: i1685).
However, co-ordination might render it unnecessary for all re-
searchers to have a disposition for serendipitous discovery. We have
known since the 16th century that specialised investigators of a variety
of skills and abilities could conceivably come together in a fruitful di-
vision of labour.14 Mering and Minkowski may have demonstrated the
function of the pancreas in diabetes by creating experimental diabetes,
but it was their technician who noticed the ﬂies loitering around the
urine of pancreas-less animals (Box 378: i1666; Box 424). Similarly, it
was Hunt who noticed the mouldy cantaloupe, before Florey, Chain,
Merck and Pﬁzer developed it into high yielding penicillin (Box 378:
i1648).
Fruitful collaborations can occur between individuals in quite dis-
parate parts of the network, across industrial sectors even. Discoveries
of polythene and Teﬂon involved the telecommunications industry and
the military as well as the chemical industry (Roberts, 1989). Strepto-
mycin and viral transmissibility of cancer were discovered after agri-
cultural poultry farmers contacted Waksman and Rous (Box 378:i1647;
Meyers, 2007, p. 157). The systemic nature of some discoveries is no-
ticeable in healthcare, where doctors, patients and researchers come
together from multiple sectors in serendipitous discovery of drugs such
as abatecept, minoxidil, imipramine.
Lastly, networks that are particularly homogeneous, cohesive and
insular may be inversely related to serendipity. Since social psycholo-
gists have explored ‘groupthink’ or ‘echo-chamber’ eﬀects in various
contexts (Janis 1972, cited in Turner and Pratkanis, 1998; Esser, 1998;
Sunstein, 2001), it is plausible to think that such eﬀects can occur
within research collaborations too. For example, large collaborations
may suﬀer from pressure to pursue a least-publishable-unit strategy
where members want a large number of incremental papers or where
each wants a turn as ﬁrst- or corresponding-author. These are tricky
ideas to test (Katz and Martin, 1997), but amidst the rapidly burgeoning
literature on research collaboration there are signs that not all
13 “Many scientists had irradiated bacteria and phage with ultraviolet light and mea-
sured survival rates. It turns out that if you measure survival in the presence of daylight,
then you get entirely diﬀerent values than when you measure survival in the dark or in
red light. The reason it hadn’t been discovered was because whoever had done the
measurements had done them very carefully under controlled conditions, always the
same light. Kelner and Dulbecco had done the experiments in a more sloppy way,
sometimes putting the plates here, and sometimes there, sometimes having the water bath
near the window and sometime not near the window” (Harding, 1978).
14 Francis Bacon’s dreamt up research organisation, the House of Solomon, included
Merchants of Light, who keep up with the work of other organisations, Mystery-men who
gather up earlier experiments into the state of the art, Pioneers who try new experiments,
Lamps who direct experiments, Inoculators who execute experiments with proﬁciency of
technicians, and Interpreters of Nature who raise former discoveries into greater axioms
and aphorisms.
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connections would facilitate serendipity (see Bozeman et al., 2016 and
references therein).
4.5. Expansion and reduction to a typology of serendipity and its
mechanisms
The four serendipity mechanisms characterised above were mapped
onto the typology to see if any preliminary patterns emerge. Cursory
examination indicates that types and mechanisms are independent
(Chisquared = 10.82, p = 0.28). However, such an analysis precludes
the possibility of diﬀerent combinations of mechanisms varying sys-
tematically by serendipity type (moreover, as described in section 2, the
examples were not subjected to proper empirical veriﬁcation).
Developing a further typology oﬀers the beneﬁt of being able to
visualise diﬀerent combinations of mechanisms underlying the seren-
dipity types, help interrogate the assumptions behind them, and explore
interaction eﬀects, if any. By identifying four dimensions of research
underlying the serendipity types, we have already completed the ﬁrst
step of what Paul Lazarsﬁeld (1937, cited in Bailey, 1994) calls “sub-
struction”. For the remainder of the process, we can extend the di-
mensions to a full typology, as in Fig. 2, and then engage in “functional
reduction”, “pragmatic reduction” or “arbitrary reduction” (Lazarsﬁeld
1937, cited in Bailey, 1994).
In order to satisfy taxonomic requirements (that types need to be
exhaustive and mutually exclusive), we will have to assume that it will
be possible to classify the mechanisms in a binary way. Each cell in
Fig. 2 is labelled in terms of presence (coded 1) or absence (coded 0).
Thus, the type in cell 1 possesses all four dimensions (1,1,1,1), and
might reasonably be called an ‘ideal’ type, while the type in cell 16
possesses none (0,0,0,0). The pair of cells 4 and 13 are also polar types,
but are not quite as extreme as cell pair 1 and 16. The interior cells
(cells 6, 7, 10 and 11) might be described as least extreme, since they
diﬀer from all other cells by no more than two dimensions, though
there is no reason to think this means they will be most prevalent
empirically.
The 16 types of mechanisms for 4 types of serendipity (64 forms!)
may be too unwieldy to be manageable, and could beneﬁt from some
reduction (Lazarsﬁeld 1937). Cell 16 can be dropped on “functional”
grounds, since no cases of serendipity are likely to be found where none
of the underlying mechanisms are present. We might collapse the
middle two rows on “pragmatic” grounds, if I make the assumption that
theory and observation are two sides of the same coin, such that cells
pairs 5 and 9, 6 and 10, 7 and 11, and 8 and 12 are merged. Or if, as I
suggested earlier, we assume that none of the mechanisms are likely to
be suﬃcient on their own, we might then eliminate on “arbitrary nu-
merical” grounds cells that do not have at least two mechanisms present
(cells 8, 12, 14, and 15).
5. Serendipity: implications and (mis)measurement
The previous sections characterised four types of serendipity
(Walpolian, Mertonian, Bushian, Stephanian) together with four me-
chanisms of serendipity (Theory-led, Observer-led, Error-borne, and
Network-emergent). The types help us to appreciate that serendipity
may exist across the research system in various forms. The mechanisms
suggest that serendipity is not random; there may be important com-
binations of factors aﬀecting its occurrence and scope for altering its
prevalence.
In this section I explore implications for policy and theory, and
suggest that they are likely to vary for diﬀerent forms of serendipity.
Measurement of these diﬀerent forms of serendipity may help underpin
policy with stronger rationales, but this would entail addressing some
diﬃcult conceptual challenges.
5.1. Serendipity: some implications of variation for theory and policy
The notion of serendipity has played an important role in debates
about the feasibility and desirability of targeting R &D investments, and
in theories about the rate and direction of scientiﬁc and technical
change (Sarewitz, 1996; Stirling, 2008; Mowery et al., 2010). Vannevar
Bush invoked serendipity to argue against targeting research to speciﬁc
goals in his blueprint for post-war science policy.15 Similarly, some
inﬂuential scientists and philosophers of science have argued that sci-
ence cannot be planned and should be left to self-organise (Polanyi,
1962; Ziman, 1994). Such views stand in contrast to others who argued
that research can and should be directed to social needs (Bernal, 1939;
Soddy 1935, cited in Guston, 2012; Sarewitz, 2016). In such debates,
defences of basic science often deploy the notion of serendipity under
the assumptions that serendipity is prevalent and that serendipity
provides unequivocal support for basic science rationales.
However, the existence of variety in serendipity, as shown in this
paper, brings these assumptions into question. The policy implications
seem more variable than simply associating serendipity with less re-
search targeting. For example, the possibility of Mertonian serendipity,
where targeted search solves the problem-in-hand via an unexpected
route and where unexpectedness lies in the approach and not the
ﬁnding, suggests that serendipity and research-targeting are not ne-
cessarily at odds with each other.
So the distribution of serendipity across the diﬀerent types may turn
out to be more signiﬁcant than its overall prevalence. Previous sections
have shown that serendipity is not conﬁned to untargeted research (the
Bushian and Stephanian types). There are also Walpolian and
Mertonian types of serendipity, which can arise from applied research
and technological development activities. If serendipity is just as pre-
valent in targeted research as it is in untargeted research, the rationale
for basic science seems to be weakened.
The breadth of serendipity is at least as important as its prevalence,
both in terms of sources and impacts. The implications of crossing over
from microbiology to pathology are quite diﬀerent from crossing over
from physics to biology. Measures of epistemic distance (e.g. inter-
disciplinarity, Rafols et al., 2012; Leahey et al., 2016) would seem to be
useful here, as well as an understanding of why the ﬂow of traﬃc is so
heavy along some routes (e.g. physics instrumentation into medicine,
lasers, x-rays, MRI scanners, see Rosenberg, 1992, 2009). Additionally,
the impact of a few serendipitous discoveries may be more signiﬁcant
and foundational in their nature for subsequent discoveries than a high
number of other serendipitous discoveries. In short, magnitude of ser-
endipity may be more deserving of attention than frequency. The tan-
gled birth of textile, chemical and pharmaceutical industries is
Fig. 2. A sixteen cell typology formed by “substruction” from four dimensions of seren-
dipity mechanisms.
15 Bush (1945, p. 12–14) asserts “Scientiﬁc progress on a broad front results from the
free play of free intellects, working on subjects of their own choice, in the manner dic-
tated by their curiosity for exploration of the unknown. Freedom of inquiry must be
preserved under any plan for government support of science… Many of the most im-
portant discoveries have come as a result of experiments undertaken with very diﬀerent
purposes in mind… the results of any one particular investigation cannot be predicted
with accuracy.”
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indicative of the possibility that the cumulative contribution of just a
handful of serendipitous discoveries to socio-economic change could be
very large.16 Evidence in support of either of these possibilities could
strengthen the rationale for untargeted research.
The scale and scope of serendipity also aﬀects our economic ratio-
nale for public funding of basic research. Early work focused on weak
incentives to invest in research due to its low appropriability (Nelson,
1959; Arrow, 1962). The private actor may have undertaken research,
and then not been able to exclusively exploit the results without a rival
party (free-rider) beneﬁting. However, the assumption that private
actors would not be able to appropriate all the beneﬁts arising from the
ﬁxed costs of their R & D investments was not only due to the risk of
free-riders, but also because the research itself might not yield what was
expected. The results could also be so unexpected that the private actor
could not make sense of them and exploit them, whilst the rival party
could. If the unexpected outcome took the form of results that could not
be exploited by the private actor but could be serendipitously exploited
by others, the disparity between private and social welfare is sub-
stantially larger than is the case where only free-riders are concerned.
There is overlap here with the oft-discussed concept of R&D spillovers.
Much of the literature has tended to refer to spillovers when research un-
dertaken by one organisation is used by another organisation. Especially
when the organisation in question is a ﬁrm, the spillover concept has been
useful for economists of innovation concerned with competition, industry
structure, and rates of return to R&D (Jaﬀe, 1989; Cohen et al., 2002; Hall
et al., 2010). Especially when the organisation in question is a university,
the spillover concept has been useful to geographers of innovation inter-
ested in spatial clustering, regional planning and diﬀerent forms of proxi-
mity (Breschi and Lissoni 2001; Bresnahan et al., 2001; Boschma, 2005;
Frenken et al., 2007). Whilst it is plausible that such knowledge ﬂows could
also apply to serendipity, it seems worth noting that serendipity can occur
not only between organisations but within them too (as exempliﬁed by
Viagra, whose re-directed development occurred largely within the
boundaries of a single ﬁrm). As such, serendipity may be pertinent for
management and organisation theory: for example, “solutions looking for a
question” in the garbage can model (Cohen et al., 1972, p. 3); en-
trepreneurship as little more than a randomwalk (Coad et al., 2015; Lui and
Rond, 2016); and infrastructures for the emergence of complex products
like drugs (Dougherty, 2016, p. 8; Gittelman, 2016, p. 1573-4).
The possibility of serendipity occurring through a variety of me-
chanisms should raise concerns among those seeking greater eﬃciency
in research, and those framing innovation solely in terms of reducing
uncertainty. The pursuit of eﬃciency could be supressing the error-
borne serendipity mechanism described in the previous section, and
driving out diversity in methodological approaches needed for
Mertonian serendipity to come about. Emphases on eﬃciency, in
combination with a shift towards funding at the project-level, might
also make it harder to recognise and appreciate that it is possible for
research to unexpectedly solve a later problem (the Stephanian type of
serendipity), where research may initially appear to have little utility
and be deemed ineﬃcient.17 The bureaucratisation of research makes
the role of teams, networks and funding pertinent for questions about
whether serendipity remains feasible or even desirable (Heinze et al.,
2009; Azoulay et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2015; Walsh and Lee, 2015).
In short, diﬀerent forms of serendipity could have diﬀerent im-
plications for policy and theory. Fig. 3 oﬀers a preliminary elaboration
of this idea. Further study into serendipity should be guided by the
possibility that considerable ﬁeld-speciﬁc diﬀerences exist. Theory-led
and observer-led serendipity mechanisms suggest that the distribution
of serendipity across ﬁelds of enquiry may be uneven. At the early
stages of science, “the pickings may be easier” (Hollingsworth, 2008, p.
330) when theory may be ripe for serendipitous discovery, as Hooke,
Priestly, Mach, Planck and others have noted (Merton and Barber,
2004, p. 160). It may be that serendipity is more prevalent in inter-
disciplinary research and nascent ﬁelds of research (Merton and Barber,
2004, p. 45; Yegros et al., 2015). Highly empirical research ﬁelds in the
natural sciences (such as astronomy, organic chemistry, medicine, and
technology) may exhibit a prevalence of serendipitous episodes not
seen in the social sciences (after taking into account that discoveries of
any sort seem to feature less prominently in the social sciences).
5.2. An amorphous unit of analysis: challenges to measuring serendipity
I have explored some of the possible motivations for measuring
serendipity. Here, I discuss some of the conceptual challenges likely to
be encountered in measuring serendipity. They relate to timing and
sources of exaggeration and suppression of serendipity.
Serendipity may depend on the window of analysis. For example, if I
were to take only the moment that Goodyear accidentally dropped
sulphur and rubber into a hot stove, I might be tempted to be classify
his discovery as untargeted research that unexpectedly solves an im-
mediate problem (the Bushian type). But putting the episode into
context would reveal it to be of another type of serendipity, because for
ten long years he had ceaselessly worked on the problem of vulcani-
sation (Box 378: i1667; Halacy, 1967). By changing our timeframes, I
ﬁnd Goodyear was searching with a deﬁned problem in mind and the
route to the solution was merely incidental (Mertonian serendipity).
The long-term impacts of serendipitous discoveries also make ana-
lysis and classiﬁcation diﬃcult. For example, in the discovery of Teﬂon,
Plunkett was searching for a non-toxic refrigerant, when he discovered
a polymer without use (because it was too expensive); this would be
Stephanian serendipity. It then solved a diﬀerent problem, for devel-
opers of the atomic bomb (who needed gaskets that would resist the
corrosive gas used to produce U235); this would be Walpolian seren-
dipity. It took decades before better known impacts emerged (cooking
utensils, transplants, pacemakers, spacesuits and so on), and if I were to
include these solutions, I am still led to classify the serendipity as
Walpolian, despite the fact that these solutions are completely diﬀerent
to the original instance of Walpolian serendipity.
16 There could be eight counts of serendipity here, perhaps more depending on how
one is to count serendipity, as explored in 5.2: Local custom had it that a man could
recover from fever after drinking from a pool which had extracts from a neighbouring
quina tree [#1]. Soaring demand for the bark of this Peruvian tree led to the isolation of
its antimalarial active ingredient, quinine, in 1820. By the 1850s, Perkin was one of many
fervently searching for a synthetic version of quinine, when he stumbled upon coal tar dye
[#2]. In the 1890s, when Elrich discovered that dyes could attach to bacteria and se-
lectively stain them, he was prompted to consider the possibility of using chemicals to
selectively kill pathogens [#3]. (This idea, chemotherapy, was vital for motivating the
search for antibiotics and their development.) In the 1920s, Domagk and others were
hired to test a range of synthetic dyes for their eﬀectiveness against disease. They found
dyes that were indeed bactericidal, but it was the sulfonamide group in them that was
essential [#4]. (The dye was merely incidental, and indeed the red tinge that some
children had acquired was in retrospect needless.) By then, Koch had developed selective
bacterial culturing techniques, after noticing a slice of old potato with diﬀerent coloured
spots [#5] (previously, bacteria were cultured in ﬂasks of nutrient broth). In the 1920s,
these were the techniques that Fleming found himself playing around with, when a drop
from his runny nose fell on a petri dish and lysed some colonies of bacteria [#6]. His
discovery of lysozyme put him on alert for noticing the ‘contaminant’ that later turned out
to be penicillin [#7]. In the 1940s, Florey and Chain, with the help of Merck and Pﬁzer,
helped to realise its commercial potential as a powerful antibiotic that could be mass-
produced. They were able to do so only after Mary Hunt, a laboratory aide, brought in
yellow mould she happened to notice growing on a rotten cantaloupe in a fruit market,
which turned out to be 3000 times more potent than Fleming’s original strain [#8]. (Box
256; Box 378; Box 424; Box 427; Meyers, 2007; Greenwood, 1992).
17 Some impacts emerge mostly over the long term. This implies the need for a trained
workforce to maintain the knowledge base within which indirect serendipitous links can
eventually be forged. “Scientiﬁc knowledge is indeed durable, but only at the price of the
heavy investments needed to maintain it. In order to make the law f = m a available in
Singapore in 1993, a large number of textbooks had to be published and sold, teachers
had to drum the message into stubborn heads, research institutions and enterprises had to
develop, researchers had to be trained and paid. Compared to the cost of maintaining a
so-called universal law, the cost of maintaining the American army in Kuwait pales into
insigniﬁcance.” Callon (1994, p. 406).
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Similarly, to describe the Friedel-Crafts procedure as a discovery
where the search for a solution to one problem led to the solution of
another (Walpolian serendipity), would be to severely understate the
vast array of ‘other’ solutions emerging in the years that followed (still
Walpolian serendipity, but more so). If one broadens the timeframe for
analysis, perhaps no other organic reaction has been of more practical
value (gasoline, artiﬁcial rubber, artiﬁcial detergents, etc). In another
example, the discovery of polythene was developed for insulating radar
cables but was then developed into an array of other products ranging
from cars to carpets.
The diﬃculty of deﬁning markers for the start- and end-points of a
serendipitous episode is exacerbated if we take seriously the notion that
researchers may have latent interests as well as active ones. The way we
treat latent questions as either having had ‘a deﬁned problem in mind’
or ‘searching with no particular problem in mind’, depends on the in-
vestigator’s work on antecedent problems. The type of serendipity be-
comes contingent on our recognition of whether the issue was at the
forefront of the investigator’s concerns.
The notion of a hunch allows investigators to post-hoc claim they
had some sort of intuition, preceding a serendipitous episode. For ex-
ample, Kerkule reported that his two most important discoveries, the
idea that atoms combine relative to their valence and the structure of
benzene, came to him in dreams (Roberts, 1989, p. 75). Another ex-
ample is Senefelder, who on a hunch treated his limestone slab with
acid to discover lithography (Halacy, 1967, p. 99). Such notions are
impossible to verify, akin to the lottery winner who claims that she
‘knew all along’ that she was going to win.
The hunch as I see it, suggests that serendipitous episodes are more
drawn out than a mere moment or ﬂash of inspiration that Canon
(1945) and others describe. The timing problem suggests serendipity is
more procedural than an event; one might instead refer to a serendi-
pitous phase, interlude or episode (Box 426:i1569).
Let us consider four situations where serendipity may be under- or
over-stated. Firstly, scientiﬁc publication may omit all the messy dead-
ends in research or work them into tidy narratives.18 Peter Medawar
took ‘retrospective falsiﬁcation’, as termed by Barber and Fox, so far as
to ask, somewhat sensationally, “Is the scientiﬁc paper a fraud?”. Ri-
chard Feynman used his Nobel lecture, as several others have done, to
describe the sequence of events and ideas in a way that he claimed he
“cannot do elsewhere …in regular journals”. Medawar and Feynman
highlight how the standard format of an orthodox paper plays a role in
suppressing much that is interesting in the scientiﬁc process for the
serendipity researcher.
Secondly, observers of serendipity may be concerned with how
meritorious their eﬀorts will seem. The investigator may worry that if
they acknowledge the role of serendipity, their accomplishments might
be seen as mere accidents, with implications for their professional
competence (or lack thereof).19 The dispute between Waksman and his
student over the discovery of streptomycin suggests that both felt en-
titled to claim credit but only the senior of the two disclosed serendi-
pitous inﬂuences (Box 378:i1647; Meyers, 2007, p. 157). Journal edi-
tors and referees might think descriptions of serendipity as mere
digressions to be deleted.
Thirdly, a serendipitous discovery might have been noticed but not
Fig. 3. Serendipity types and mechanisms: some implications for
theory and policy (Bijker et al., 1987; David et al., 1999; Gibbons,
1994; Merton, 1973; Pavitt, 1999).
18 Merton notes that “the elegance and parsimony prescribed for the presentation of
the results of scientiﬁc work tend to falsify retrospectively the actual process by which the
results were obtained” and “the etiquette governing the writing of scientiﬁc (or scholarly)
papers requires them to be works of vast expurgation, stripping the complex events that
culminated in the published reports of everything except their delimited cognitive sub-
stance. In short the audience demands a well-formulated argument that retrospectively
imposes a logical form on the romance of investigation” (Merton and Barber, 2004, p. 159
and 272).
19 A serendipitous discovery may be seen as less worthy than one made without ser-
endipity. As one Nobel laureate declared, “I think the Nobel Prize brought undue rewards.
I got it for a purely accidental discovery. Anybody could have done that. This is often true
in experimental physics. I think you can happen to be in a position where an important
discovery is right there” (Merton and Barber, 2004, p. 296).
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exploited because the observer was unable to convince others that the
discovery was worth pursuing. Or perhaps the investigator is so com-
mitted to their search target by their patrons or future evaluators (e.g.
Journal editors, referees, grant reviewers, technical directors), that they
refuse to be distracted by new research goals. If we relax the assump-
tion that the discovery is “happy” for everyone, and consider that the
discovery might be “strategic” only for some, we might start asking for
whom was the episode serendipitous. Consider for example an alcoholic
who discovers his raﬄe ticket has won him a bottle of whiskey.
There are several examples of serendipitous observations not being
recognised by others. In his masters dissertation, Scott reported his
observation that an internal secretion from the pancreas controlled
sugar metabolism. His supervisor dismissed the observation and edited
the article before publication. Years later, the supervisor wrote to Scott,
“I feel I personally have to shoulder a great deal of blame for dis-
couraging you from going ahead with that work” (Sawyer, 1966, p.
617). In another example, Marshall so struggled to convince gastro-
enterologists of his observation that bacteria could cause stomach ul-
cers that, in desperation, he resorted to self-experimentation (Meyers,
2007, p. 105).20
Fourthly, the unexpectedness of the discovery may not necessarily
be the same as far as the researcher and the funder are concerned.
Funders may have intended for there to be cross-over from their de-
signated target, or investigators may have been well aware of multiple
avenues that were potentially fruitful but disclosed only some of them.
Such possibilities are diﬃcult to discern beyond what is stated in pro-
posals or funders’ mission statements, but it is worth noting that pro-
posals might be misleading for the purposes of tracing serendipity
(because they reﬂect what the investigator thought would secure the
funding, not what the investigator actually expected or planned to do)
and mission statements can often be reduced to meaningless levels of
generality. This may lead to over-estimates of serendipity.
These situations, where serendipity might be over- and under-
stated, seem relevant to what Leahey calls “data editing”. She shows
large variation in how researchers deal with data, in how they clean
datasets of apparently illogical, seemingly incorrect, or supposedly in-
accurate data, and in researcher-opinions about ‘proper’ use of data.
She ﬁnds that some of that variation depends on discipline, data col-
lection method, characteristics of the data-editing situation like whe-
ther the problem is with an independent or dependent variable, and
status and seniority (Leahey et al., 2003; Leahey, 2004). It seems rea-
sonable to think that research governance structures might broadly and
systematically aﬀect ‘what’s in and what’s omitted’, and have important
implications for serendipity measurement (Owen-Smith, 2001; Leahey,
2008).
6. Conclusions
The main contribution of this paper has been to develop a typology
of serendipity in research and to identify the main mechanisms through
which it occurs. I drew on the Merton archives to help collect hundreds
of examples of serendipity. Rather than explore their histories in pursuit
of a research program in sociological semantics as Merton did, I ana-
lysed these examples for similarities and diﬀerences with respect to
types and mechanisms of serendipity in order to clarify new empirical
research questions in the ﬁeld of research policy and explore their
possible policy implications.
The typology took the notion of serendipity, widely but vaguely inter-
preted as simple happy accidents, and developed it into four, more speciﬁc,
interpretations: Walpolian, Mertonian, Bushian and Stephanian. They are
distinguished by ﬁrstly, whether there was a targeted line of enquiry when
the discovery emerged, and secondly, what type of problem the discovery
solved (see Fig. 1).
Four mechanisms of serendipity were explored. Serendipity may
depend on the attributes of the observer and her situation (such as her
perceptiveness, instruments and observation systems), or it may depend
on the characteristics of the ﬁeld of inquiry itself (such as when the
growth of theory becomes conspicuous for discovery). I noted that er-
rors took a prominent position in many accounts of serendipity, where
seemingly critical substances have been dropped, spilled, inadvertently
heated or exploded, forgotten about in pockets or drawers or laid to rest
over holidays, contaminated, or subjected to methodological blunder
and/or equipment malfunction. Serendipity may depend on such
‘controlled sloppiness’, where experimental design is loosely directed
enough to allow discoveries to emerge, but not so uncontrolled that
variations cannot be traced back to a source. Lastly, I suggested that
networks play dual, informational and teamwork, roles in serendipity,
or conversely might discourage serendipity through groupthink eﬀects.
The types help us to recognise some of the variety of serendipity
that is possible, and allows us to appreciate that serendipity may exist
in basic science, applied research and technological development ac-
tivities. The mechanisms suggest that serendipity is not random, there
may be important factors aﬀecting its occurrence, and there may even
be scope for altering its prevalence. Moreover, policy and theory im-
plications may vary by type and mechanism of serendipity (see Fig. 3).
Serendipity does not necessarily strengthen rationales for un-
targeted research, and conversely do not necessarily weaken rationales
for targeted research. The desirability of altering the prevalence of
certain types of serendipity may depend on whether certain mechan-
isms of serendipity are believed to be associated with better research
performance, or believed to be a hindrance to achieving targeted social
goals.
The possibility of serendipity occurring through a variety of me-
chanisms should raise concerns among those seeking greater eﬃciency
in research, and those framing innovation solely in terms of reducing
uncertainty. The pursuit of eﬃciency could be supressing the error-
borne serendipity mechanism, and driving out diversity in methodolo-
gical approaches needed for Mertonian serendipity to come about.
Greater pressure for eﬃciency might also make it harder to recognise
and appreciate that it is possible for research to unexpectedly solve a
later problem, where research may initially appear to have little utility
and be deemed ineﬃcient.
For those wishing to measure serendipity, I discussed some con-
ceptual diﬃculties relating to the unit of analysis, and potential sources
of over- and under-estimation of serendipity. There is clearly much
about serendipity that currently deﬁes large-sample quantitative ana-
lysis and will require qualitative eﬀorts to go hand-in-hand for the time
being.
Even while emphasising some of the measurement diﬃculties, I
believe it is important to know more about the frequency, magnitude
and qualitative nature of serendipity. Developing the implications of
serendipity for policy and theory is not clear-cut, and will require a
better sense of how serendipity is distributed across the research
system. I hope that the typology of serendipity and discussion of its
mechanisms developed here facilitate research along these lines.
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